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 Madison and Shannon on Social 
Media 
Justin “Gus” Hurwitz* 
ABSTRACT 
The Internet has changed speech, and our traditional understandings of speech 
regulation are struggling to adapt. This article argues that the Internet has tipped 
the quantity of information that individuals are exposed to beyond the point which 
they are able to meaningfully process. This article draws from a range of fields—
from Information Theory, to cognitive psychology, to informatics—to provide 
both empirical and theoretical support for the idea that there is a limit to how 
much information individuals can meaningfully process and that we have sur-
passed that limit. This argument poses a direct challenge to bedrock First 
Amendment concepts such as the marketplace of ideas and the mantra that “the 
best response to bad speech is more good speech.” 
“1990: The internet will put all of human knowledge at our finger-
tips, ushering in a new age of enlightenment. Now: People have 
stopped vaccinating their kids, think the Earth is flat, and are falling 
into the Grand Canyon while taking selfies for Instagram.” 
- Literally a random tweet I saw while writing this article1 
   
                                                          
*Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Space, Cyber, and Telecom Law Program, University of 
Nebraska College of Law and Director of Law & Economics Programs, International Center for Law 
& Economics; Program Affiliate NYU School of Law Classical Liberalism Institute. JD, University of 
Chicago, 2007; MA, George Mason University (economics), 2010; BA, St. John’s College, 2003. With 
thanks to Jackson Slechta and Justin McCully for helpful research assistance. 
1.John Lyon (@JohnLyonTweets), TWITTER (May 7, 2019, 5:08 PM), 
https://twitter.com/JohnLyonTweets/status/1125915332575727617. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has changed speech, and our traditional understandings of speech 
regulation are struggling to adapt. This is not a new idea: since it was opened to 
popular use in the early 1990s, academics have argued that the Internet changes 
the dynamics of speech in ways that current legal doctrine does not abide.2 This 
article goes a step further to make the case that “this time things are different.” It 
argues that the Internet (social media in particular) has unquestionably tipped the 
quantity of information that individuals are exposed to beyond the point which 
they are able to meaningfully process that information. Additionally, it argues that 
those individuals are exposed to so much information that they are unable to 
meaningfully discriminate “good” information (meaningful signal) from “bad” 
information (noise), such that all information to which they are exposed becomes 
indistinguishable from noise. 
This article draws from a range of fields—from Information Theory, to cogni-
tive psychology, to informatics. It will provide both empirical and theoretical 
support for the idea that there is a limit to how much information individuals can 
meaningfully process, and that we have surpassed that limit. This, in turn, poses a 
direct challenge to bedrock First Amendment concepts such as the marketplace of 
ideas and the mantra that “the best response to bad speech is more good speech.” 
The purpose of this article is modest–merely to argue that First Amendment doc-
trine has run up against a hard limit that requires potentially fundamental change. 
While it offers some musings about potential solutions, it does not purport to solve 
what may legitimately be the most important challenge to a defining element of 
our democracy. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses how the Internet has 
changed speech, focusing on the exponential growth in the production and distri-
bution of information, juxtaposed with our relatively constant ability to process or 
otherwise use that information. This part also discusses how dramatically de-
creased costs of producing and distributing information has reduced the need for 
speech intermediaries to facilitate the production and distribution of speech. One 
effect of this dynamic is that it is much easier today to create and spread “bad” 
speech. Part III looks at the traditional models in American law for addressing 
“bad” speech, most notably the marketplace of ideas metaphor, and argues that 
these mechanisms are ill-suited to the world of “too much speech.” Part IV turns 
to Information Theory to argue that we may be at a point of too much speech, 
explaining that every communication channel has a theoretical maximum infor-
mation carrying capacity and that once you exceed that capacity, meaningful sig-
nal (akin to “good” speech) becomes indistinguishable from noise (akin to “bad” 
speech). This effectively reduces the overall ability to communicate information. 
However, Information Theory also offers possible solutions to this information 
saturation problem, which are explored in the context of speech. Finally, Part V 
offers tentative thoughts about possible paths forward. 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., Qasim Rashid, In Harm’s Way: The Desperate Need to Update America’s Free Speech 
Model, 47 STETSON L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2017); Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web 
That Never Forgets, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 345, 355 (2011); Eugene Volokh, Cheap 
Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J.1805, 180–1807 (1994). 
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II. HOW THE INTERNET HAS CHANGED SPEECH 
A. Exponential Growth in Information Production Outpaces 
Human Ability to Process that Information 
Few would contest that the Internet has changed how we produce, distribute, 
and consume information.3 The growth in the amount of information produced 
every year is well documented.4 The Internet has given the majority of humans 
alive today near immediate access to these immeasurable troves of information,5 
and more people are spending more time consuming information than ever be-
fore.6 While much of this growth is attributable to the Internet and, more general-
ly, the information technology revolution of the past century, it is also worth not-
ing that this is a continuation of a much longer-term trend in the exponential 
growth in human production of information.7 
Over roughly the same period that we have seen exponential growth in the 
human ability to produce and distribute information, our ability to process that 
information has remained relatively static. While there may be seemingly large 
variations in individuals, as a species, humans in ancient Egypt, Greece, Dark 
Ages England, the Renaissance, and the era of Twitter have all had roughly con-
stant mental capacity.8 Indeed, while there may be (or have been) significant dif-
ferences between Aristotle, Einstein, and Kelly Bundy, that difference in infor-
                                                          
 3. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (To American Democracy), 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 200, 200–202 (2017) (discussing consumer reactions to fake news.); Volokh, supra 
note 2, at 1826 (discussing how the internet will lower production cost thereby increasing the overall 
number of producers which will cater to more unique tastes). 
 4. The Exponential Growth of Data, INSIDEBIGDATA (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://insidebigdata.com/2017/02/16/the-exponential-growth-of-data/; Elisabetta Raguseo, Big data 
technologies: An empirical investigation on their adoption, benefits and risks for companies, 
38 INTER’L J. OF INFO. MGMT. 187, 188 (2018) (“For example, more than 98,000 tweets are written 
every sixty seconds, 695,000 status updates are posted on Facebook, 11 million instant messages are 
written, 685,445 Google searches are lunched, more than 169 million emails are sent, more than 1820 
TB of data are created, and there are 217 new mobile web users.”); Martin Hilbert and Priscila López, 
The World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 
60 (2011); Martin Hilbert, How much information is there in the “informationsociety”?, 9 
SIGNIFICANCE 8 (2012). 
 5. J. Clement, Number of internet users worldwide from 2005 to 2018 (in millions), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/ (last updated Jan. 9, 
2019). 
 6. JEFFREY I. COLE, MICHAEL SUMAN, PHOEBE SCHRAMM, & LIUNING ZHOU, THE 2017 DIGITAL 
FUTURE REPORT: SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE 10 (2017), https://www.digitalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/2017-Digital-Future-Report-2.pdf. 
 7. For a fascinating discussion of the exponential nature of growth in information, see generally 
Phil Metzger (@DrPhiltill), TWITTER (May 29, 2019), 
https://twitter.com/DrPhiltill/status/1133876121114697728. In human terms, these trends can be seen 
by following the development of spoken, and then written, language, leading to the development of 
writing and improved writing technologies, and then the development and improvement of transmis-
sion technologies – from language to writing to couriers to postal networks to books to the printing 
press, to the telegraph to the radio to the telephone to the transistor and then the computer to the Inter-
net, at each stage along this progression the cost of producing, distributing, and using information went 
down and the production, distribution, and use of information was made possible for an increasing 
number of people, leading to exponential growth. 
 8. Suzana Herculano-Houzel & Jon H. Kaas, Gorilla and Orangutan Brains Conform to the Pri-
mate Cellular Scaling Rules: Implications for Human Evolution, 77 BRAIN, BEHAVIOR AND 
EVOLUTION 33, 43 (2011). 
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mation-processing ability is orders of magnitude less significant than the growth 
in our ability to produce and distribute information. 
Many factors have driven this exponential growth in our ability to produce 
and distribute information. One driver has certainly been decreasing costs (broad-
ly defined). Additionally, though, literacy is now widespread, as is access to me-
dia for recording information, both physical (paper) and digital (computers or 
phones). There is more standardization in language, such that most of the world’s 
population can communicate in one of relatively few dominant languages, and 
even those who cannot are able to use technology to communicate in multimedia 
format (e.g., photos and video). 
B. Disintermediation 
The loss of intermediation in how information is communicated has been an 
important driver in the Internet’s effect on speech. This change results from, but is 
as important as, the decrease in distribution costs. Before the modern era, mass 
distribution of information required access to an expensive platform – like a tele-
vision, radio station, or printing press. This meant that only those who had access 
to (and, by necessity, the resources to have access to) these platforms could dis-
tribute information at a large scale.9 Today, anyone with access to a computer can 
send a tweet, with greater reach than any platform that existed before this millen-
nium.10 
This loss of the need for intermediaries has, in turn, led to a loss in (or a 
change in the nature of) those intermediaries that continue to exist.11 The lack of 
need for intermediaries has created competitive pressures that have changed the 
nature of the traditional intermediated media.12 Simply stated, in an era where the 
New York Times is competing with Twitter for readers, the content produced by 
the New York Times has become more like the content one would find on Twit-
ter.13 
An important second-order effect of this loss of intermediation is that the 
burden of evaluating information has shifted from those distributing information 
to those receiving information. In an era of intermediated information distribution, 
intermediaries necessarily perform an editorial and filtering function by gathering, 
evaluating, and selecting information for distribution on their platforms. Only a 
platform that was able to distribute information at near-zero cost (that is, it did not 
face scarcity on its platform) would forego this selection process, but any platform 
                                                          
 9. Volokh, supra note 2, at 1806-07 (“…Speaking today is expensive....”). 
 10. Hasen, supra note 3, at 212 (indicating that President Trump would not be able to directly reach 
his millions of followers if he used a weekly radio address or a speech from the Oval Office). 
 11. Id. at 203. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Sofia Grafanaki, Drowning in Big Data: Abundance of Choice, Scarcity of Attention and the 
Personalization Trap, A Case for Regulation, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2017) (discussing how 
news entities are beginning to allow collaboration between the business department and journalists to 
increase clickability); see also MANUEL CASTELLS, RUPTURE: THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 21 
(2019) (“In a world of digital networks that allow anyone to express themselves, there are no real rules 
other than personal agency and freedom of speech. This means that traditional checking and censuring 
mechanisms fall by the wayside, messages of all types form a powerful and polymorphic groundswell, 
bots multiply and spread memes and sound bites all around and the post-truth world, which the tradi-
tional media end up participating in, transforms uncertainty into the only reliable truth: ‘my truth,’ 
each individual’s truth.”). 
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with such abundant capacity would more likely transition from the business of 
being an intermediary to instead being a distribution platform.14 
In an ecosystem with exceptionally low distribution costs, in which a signifi-
cant portion of content is distributed directly from producer to consumer without 
an evaluating intermediary in between, it is up to the consumer to evaluate the 
information. This leads to an important question: how has the increased availabil-
ity of information affected the cost of evaluating that information? One could 
imagine, for instance, that the availability of low-cost, near-immediate access to 
the world’s collected knowledge would make it exceptionally easy for information 
consumers to evaluate information; the answer to every question is just a Google 
search away! On the other hand, if information consumers need to evaluate an 
increasing quantity of information that exceeds the decline in the cost of evaluat-
ing that information, the loss of intermediated information effectively shifts a 
substantial burden from information intermediaries to information consumers. 
The shifted burden raises concerns of the bearability of such costs. In an in-
formation ecosystem with, say, one million information consumers that used to 
have ten intermediaries, even assuming that those consumers are as good at evalu-
ating information as those intermediaries (which is unlikely), the disintermediated 
ecosystem has as a starting baseline 100,000 times the information-evaluation 
costs as the intermediated one. These costs are entirely duplicative (that is, there 
are one million information consumers spending resources evaluating information 
as opposed to ten intermediaries). 
The disintermediation of information distribution, in other words, and as will 
be discussed at greater length below, is a central part of the contemporary story of 
information. 
III. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF SPEECH REGULATION (DO 
NOT WORK) 
The state of affairs described above bodes ill for traditional American under-
standings of speech and information, as captured in the First Amendment. The 
prevailing American approach to speech and information is to overwhelmingly 
reject restrictions on speech. Where “bad” speech is interjected into our social, 
political, economic, or other discourse, we rely on the so-called marketplace of 
ideas to embrace “good” speech as inherently more valuable than, and therefore as 
a corrective to, the ills of bad speech. This stands in contrast to the alternative, 
which would rely on some form of government control over speech, necessarily in 
the form of restrictions placed upon speech deemed “bad” by the government or 
majoritarian groups favored by the government. 
The discussion below develops these ideas further, discussing traditional un-
derstandings of speech regulation in American law. This discussion lays the 
groundwork for Part IV, which synthesizes the discussions here and in Part II to 
                                                          
 14. And, indeed, this is largely what led to the advent of our modern information ecosystem. For 
instance, as cable systems’ capacity expanded greatly in the early 1990, they regularly bartered channel 
capacity in exchange for content. This is how many traditional broadcasters, such as NBC, developed 
their contemporary cable networks (e.g., CNBC, MSNBC, &c). W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, LEE W. 
MCKNIGHT & RICHARD JAY SOLOMON, THE GORDIAN KNOT: POLITICAL GRIDLOCK ON THE 
INFORMATION HIGHWAY 209–211 (1999). 
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understand why the modern speech environment poses fundamental challenges to 
traditional American free speech principles. 
A. The First Amendment 
Among other things, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from “abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press.”15 This is a bedrock doctrine of our 
democratic republic. A society structured around the vote of the people necessari-
ly depends on those people to be informed to meaningfully provide governance 
through their votes. More specifically, they should be informed by voices inde-
pendent from the government over which their votes provide oversight.16 As such, 
the First Amendment has been interpreted broadly: for instance, it allows the press 
to publish top secret government files,17 allows citizens to burn the American 
flag,18 requires the government to allow Nazis to gather and demonstrate in public 
spaces,19 prohibits the government from requiring Internet-based platforms from 
ensuring that children are not exposed to pornography,20 and even prohibits the 
government from barring convicted sex offenders from accessing social media 
sites where children are known to gather.21 
But the First Amendment is not an absolute guarantee of free speech. To the 
contrary, government regulation of speech is governed by complex doctrine that 
specifies (if often in non-specific terms) the circumstances and conditions under 
which different types of speech can be regulated. For instance, regulations based 
on the content of speech are subject to strict scrutiny by the courts, under which 
only regulations narrowly tailored to address a compelling government interest, 
and that do so in the lease restrictive means, are permissible.22 On the other hand, 
content-neutral speech regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, under 
which the time, place, and manner of speech can be reasonably proscribed to ad-
vance an important government interest.23 Some types of speech are not protected 
by the First Amendment at all. 
B. The Marketplace of Ideas and Bad Speech 
The discussion of the First Amendment above is not meant to offer a compre-
hensive introduction to, or overview of, the First Amendment. Rather, it is to 
                                                          
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech in 
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 334 (1996) (discussing the “indispensable connec-
tion [of free speech] to the maintenance of democratic principles”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (observing that the founding generation viewed public 
discussion as a civic duty and that the means to prevail over bad thoughts is through public discus-
sion); see also Jeffrey Rosen, America Is Living James Madison’s Nightmare, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/james-madison-mob-rule/568351/. 
 17. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). 
 19. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977). 
 20. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 21. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017). 
 22. David L. Hudson, Jr., Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech §2:2 (2012). 
 23. Id. 
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highlight the American Constitutional commitment to free speech – a uniquely 
strong one, even among liberal Western democracies.24 While America is not 
unique in placing great value on freedom of speech, the American commitment to 
it is uniquely constitutional, sounding in the importance of revolutionary speech in 
the establishment of the country.25 Speech is a critical bulwark, and perhaps the 
most important organizing force, against the sort of government abuses that ani-
mated the American Revolution. As a result, these values are part of the American 
constitutional DNA. 
This conception of speech does not deny the potential for harmful speech. Its 
focus is not so much on the nature of speech as it is on the mechanism for moder-
ating potentially harmful speech. The First Amendment means that it is not the 
responsibility of the government to police speech–and, indeed, that the govern-
ment is expressly prohibited from acting as arbiter of speech. 
In place of the government as arbiter of ideas, we rely on the famous meta-
phor of the marketplace of ideas to regulate speech.26 Under this model, speech 
occurs in a competitive marketplace. Better ideas will achieve more success than 
lesser ideas; false speech will be eschewed in favor of true speech; socially valua-
ble speech, and the speakers uttering it, will be rewarded. Speech that is better for 
citizens will be heard and be powerful, regardless of whether that speech is favor-
able to the government, and bad speech from those in political power will be 
checked by responses from those outside of power. 
The First Amendment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for this 
marketplace of ideas to operate. Freedom of speech only ensures that such a mar-
ketplace is free to operate. But its operation, in turn, assumes a robust dialogue 
between speakers. As captured by Justice Brandeis, “[t]hose who won our inde-
pendence believed … that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people [and] 
that public discussion is a political duty.”27 This was more succinctly stated in 
subsequent opinions: the response to bad speech is more, better, speech.28 Success 
                                                          
 24. Derek E. Bambauer, The New American Way of Censorship, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2013, at 32, 34 
(“Most observers saw America’s free speech protections as exemplary, if not outright exceptional, in 
an international environment of increasingly pervasive censorship.”); James M. Boland, Is Free Speech 
Compatible with Human Dignity, Equality, and Democratic Government: America, A Free Speech 
Island in A Sea of Censorship?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 16 (2013). 
 25. For a discussion of traditions of freedom of speech from around the world, see generally Ronald 
Krotoszynski, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2006) (discussing the 
traditions of freedom of speech around the world). 
 26. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821 (2008) (“Ever since 
Justice Holmes invoked the concept in his Abrams dissent, academic and popular understandings of 
the First Amendment have embraced the notion that free speech, like the free market, creates a compet-
itive environment in which the best ideas ultimately prevail.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
630 (1919). 
 27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969). 
 28. Id. at 377 (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”); 
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (“ The township obviously remains 
free to continue “the process of education” it has already begun”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 
U.S. 525, 586 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“And, if its concern is that tobacco advertising com-
municates a message with which it disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with “more 
speech, not enforced silence,”); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (“The remedy for 
speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society.”); Williams-
Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1684 (2015) (“If there is concern about principled, decent, and 
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of the marketplace of ideas, in other words, is premised both on the freedom of 
speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, as well as the exercise of that 
freedom, as believed would be fulfilled as a matter of political duty. 
But markets fail, and the marketplace of ideas is no exception. Citizens may 
fail to hold up their end of the speech bargain; they may fail to exercise their duty 
to engage in the public discussion that guides operation of the marketplace of 
ideas, or they may simply be insufficiently equipped to meaningfully participate in 
that market.29 More concerningly, there may be a fundamental error in the found-
ing generation’s belief in the possibility of a marketplace of ideas. The duty for 
citizens to engage in public discourse may be an impossible one to be discharged 
at scale.30 
C. A Madisonian View 
The idea that the marketplace of ideas can fail is not surprising to most partic-
ipants in the contemporary media marketplace. At its best, the era of the “vast 
wasteland”31 of modern media was dominated by an ethos of “if it bleeds it 
leads.”32 Today, the same phenomenon is more pithily captured by the epithet of 
“clickbait.”33 Success in the contemporary marketplace of ideas is determined by 
consumption of those ideas, not by their quality; therefore, those “ideas” that 
command greater attention are the ones driving the intellectual economy. At some 
level this is driven by the economics of media markets – that is, by advertising. 
The more consumer engagement a platform can generate, the more ad revenue 
follows, and the path to engagement is the more prurient interests, not the enlight-
ened ones. 
There is another explanation for this failure that is more charitable to the con-
sumers of ideas: the more ideas that we are exposed to, the more time we must 
spend evaluating those ideas. But we only have finite time, so we can only evalu-
ate so many ideas.34 The more robust the competition is in the marketplace for 
ideas, that is to say, the more ideas there are–the less effective the marketplace 
becomes as a filter. This suggests that the failure of the marketplace results less 
                                                          
thoughtful discourse in election campaigns, the First Amendment provides the answer. That answer is 
more speech.”) 
 29. See supra Part III A. 
 30. See supra Part IV B. 
 31. Newton N. Minnow, FCC Chairman, Speech at Convention of the National Association of 
Broadcasters (May 9, 1961). 
 32. See Bill Gates (@Bill Gates), TWITTER (June 11, 2019, 1:58 PM), 
https://twitter.com/BillGates/status/1138520780042465280; Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., How the Media 
Misrepresents Juvenile Policies, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1998, at 37, 38 (“It seems to be true that ‘if it 
bleeds, it leads’ is a governing maxim on both local and network news shows.”); David N. Lawrence 
ET AL., It’s the Cyber Crime and Its Sponsors (Not My Cyber-Security), Stupid, 5 J.L. & CYBER 
WARFARE 1, 32 (2017) (“Increasingly, when it comes to hacked information and our social media 
platforms: If it bleeds, it leads, reads and gets believed.”). 
 33. Alexandra Andorfer, Spreading Like Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake News Problem on 
Social Media Via Technology Controls and Government Regulation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1409, 1424 
(2018). 
 34. See Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3 (2001); see 
also Bryan Caplan, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 
(2007). 
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from a failure of its participants to faithfully discharge their duty of public dis-
course and more from that duty being impossible for the public to bear. 
Regardless of the nature of this failure, the founders of the nation were aware 
that a freedom of speech alone would not be a sufficient bulwark against an incip-
ient intellectual tyranny that could wreck the American experiment.35 Perhaps 
none was more keenly aware of this than James Madison, who recognized these 
failures as endemic. As he wrote in Federalist 55, “[i]n all very numerous assem-
blies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre 
from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assem-
bly would still have been a mob.”36 The deliberative process of the marketplace of 
ideas moves slowly. But the power of the individual ideas moving through that 
marketplace to grab the attention of their consumers is potent; popular ideas, re-
gardless of their merit, can grab the attention of the masses and be translated into 
belief and action quickly. This gives rise to what Madison labeled in Federalist 10 
as “factions,” or groups “united and actuated by some common impulse of pas-
sion.”37 
Just as speech was intended to serve as a bulwark against the excesses and 
abuses of government, Madison envisioned the structure of our government to 
serve as a bulwark against the excesses of speech that give rise to factions. Our 
government was deliberately designed to be inefficient, incorporating various 
deliberative circuit breakers to slow the formation of factions and to impose time 
of reflection upon their calls to action. 
The House of Representatives was intended to translate the will of the people 
quickly into actions proposed to the slower-moving and more deliberative Sen-
ate.38 The Electoral College stood as a slowing intermediary between the will of 
the people and the election of a President.39 Madison even viewed the young na-
tion’s relatively vast geography and large population as virtues in this light, ensur-
ing that ideas would be slow to spread and that there would be ample time for 
deliberation and response before any single idea could give rise to action. In other 
words, under the Madisonian view, the response to bad speech emphatically is not 
more, better, speech. It is slower, more deliberative speech. 
This, unfortunately, is also the cause of the great failure that we are seeing to-
day in the marketplace of ideas approach to speech: the trend of exponential 
growth in information production and distribution, which began with the advent of 
language, has shrunk the geography of communication at a rate that far exceeds 
the rate of growth in geography and population. Today, the decision of a mayor of 
a small town can be just as visible, just as quickly as that of the President of the 
                                                          
 35. Rosen, supra note 16 (discussing the Madisonian concerns about the risk that factions pose to 
democracy and discussing various mechanisms built into our Constitutional structure that are designed 
to cool down speech and promote greater deliberation). 
 36. The Federalist No. 55, at 275 (James Madison) (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 37. The Federalist No. 10, 49 (James Madison) (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 38. Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 180 (1997). 
 39. Harv. L. Rev., Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One 
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2528 (2001) (“To effectuate this compromise, the Framers 
divided the presidential election process into two stages: a “nomination” stage, in which 
an electoral college of elders would express a filtered version of the popular will, and a “selection” 
stage, in which the House of Representatives would ultimately choose the winner from among the top 
several candidates.”). 
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United States; a state legislator is subject to the same media coverage as a member 
of the House of Representatives or a Senator (both of whom are treated as roughly 
equivalent in contemporary media); and the CEO of a Fortune 10 company is 
subject to the same media attention as a middle school principal.40 
The institutional circuit breakers that Madison envisioned as sufficient to 
slow down the flow of information in the 1800s and stymie the formation of fac-
tions and advantage deliberative discourse may have been suitable to the infor-
mation technology of the era. However, they are meaningless in the face of the 
flow of information that exists today. 
IV. AN INFORMATION THEORY UNDERSTANDING OF SPEECH 
REGULATION 
The Madisonian and marketplace of ideas views of how to deal with bad in-
formation discussed in Part III—more (and slower) deliberation versus more in-
formation—are remarkably different. As a phenomenological matter, Madison’s 
approach has lost out: as technology has improved, every one of us has consistent-
ly been exposed to more and more information. But that does not mean that our 
contemporary superabundance of information is a desirable alternative. 
Our contemporary information age was made possible, in part, by the formal-
ized study of the nature of information. The mathematic field of Information The-
ory was developed precisely to study questions of the nature of information and 
the theoretical limits of information density and transmission capacity. This field 
gives us reason to pause over the marketplace of ideas’ “more speech” theory of 
addressing bad speech – indeed, Information Theory suggests that, after a certain 
point, more speech makes all speech bad speech. But it also gives us tools to think 
about how to mitigate the problems of both bad speech and simply too much 
speech. 
                                                          
 40. Dave Goldiner, Barney Frank predicts Mayor Pete will fall short of White House - not that 
there’s anything wrong with that, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2019, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-barney-frank-pete-buttigieg-gay-president-20190604-
p325ij74cfb6nhicppmuxcd6iq-story.html; Dave Goldiner, Trump Claims Immigration Problem 
‘Solved!’ After Murky Mexico Tariffs Deal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2019 12:15 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-trump-immigration-mexico-tariffs-democrats-
20190608-ch7jr47atrdsdi5fartvjw7hry-story.html; Michael McAuliff, Nita Lowey went from the 
Queens PTA to being the most powerful NY congresswoman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2019, 6:00 
AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-nita-lowey-chair-of-appropriations-trump-
alexandria-ocasio-cortez-20190112-story.html; Denis Slattery, AOC returning to her bartending roots 
to advocate for raising minimum wage for restaurant employees and other tipped workers, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (May 28, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-ocasio-cortez-
restaurant-workers-minimum-wage-tipped-20190528-gmvdbirsxfdgrbkumfwp42hpaq-story.html; Ex-
Fortune 500 exec pleads guilty to killing couple, unborn baby in attempted suicide car wreck in New 
Hampshire, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2018, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ex-fortune-500-exec-pleads-guilty-wreck-killed-couple-
article-1.2121520; Michael Gartland & Michael Gartland, Bronx middle school principal demoted 
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A. Information Theory 
A phenomenally abstract area of science,41 Information Theory studies how 
we can encode and transmit information – and how we can do so efficiently. Two 
of its fundamental theorems, the source coding theorem and channel coding theo-
rem, explain the absolute minimum amount of storage (e.g., “bits”) needed to 
encode a piece of information and the absolute maximum capacity of a communi-
cations channel , respectively.42 Together, these two theorems express a funda-
mental limit to how much information can be communicated between any two 
points over any given communications channel. 
Although phenomenally abstract, the existence of such a limit is as important 
for a society living in an “information age” to understand as Newton’s laws of 
motion or the speed of light have been to understanding our physical world. In-
formation can fairly be called the bedrock of most democratic institutions. The 
idea that information exists in discretely measurable quantities and is subject to 
constraints on how it can be represented and communicated is as fundamentally 
important as the concept of scarcity is to physical resources. Indeed, an implica-
tion of Information Theory is that information may be as subject to the laws of 
scarcity, at least along some dimensions, as any other resources. The only reason 
that these ideas have not already presented recognizable (let alone significant) 
challenges to society is that we have not previously approached the limits of how 
we use information. However, contemporary information technology increasingly 
pushes against these limits. Indeed, Claude Shannon initially developed Infor-
mation Theory to understand the theoretical limits of the digital communications 
technologies being developed by AT&T. His goal was to establish a benchmark 
against which information and communications technologies could be measured.43 
As our society increasingly relies upon these technologies, which in turn push 
against the technological limits of information, our society is increasingly likely to 
find itself pushing up against the limits on the use of information in society. 
One of the central theorems of Information Theory, the channel capacity the-
orem, tells us that any communications channel has a maximum theoretical capac-
ity. A telephone line, a fiber optic cable, and a 5G smartphone, for instance, each 
have a theoretical maximum data transfer rate; because we can calculate those 
rates, we design those systems to operate as closely to those maximum rates as 
possible given the current state of technology. 
The key insight from (and the mathematical determinant of) the channel cod-
ing theorem is that the capacity of a given communications channel is bounded by 
the signal-to-noise ratio. “Signal” is the portion of a communication that carries 
information intelligible to the recipient; noise is anything else. By way of meta-
                                                          
 41. Information Theory, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_theory (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2019) (explaining that Information Theory “is at the intersection of mathematics, statistics, 
computer science, physics, neurobiology, information engineering, and electrical engineering.”). 
 42. See Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM TECH. J. 379m 379, 
381 (1948). This is the foundational article of Information Theory, which defines both of these theo-
rems. 
 43. Id. at 380–381 (“We wish to consider certain general problems involving communication sys-
tems. To do this it is first necessary to represent the various elements involved as mathematical enti-
ties, suitably idealized from their ideal physical counterparts.”). 
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phor, if you are having a conversation in a noisy room, “signal” is the words you 
are exchanging with your interlocutor, and noise is just that—background noise. 
The differentiator between “signal” and “noise” is intelligibility. Background 
noise makes it harder to make out what your interlocutor is saying. To overcome 
that noise, the speaker will either need to speak more slowly or more loudly, or 
both. If she speaks more slowly, the channel capacity is obviously reduced (it will 
take longer for anything to be said). If she speaks more loudly, then everyone else 
in the room will also have a more difficult time hearing each other speak, so they 
will need to speak more loudly in turn; the net result in this scenario is that the 
channel capacity for everyone will be reduced. 
That last part is the critical observation for our modern, high velocity, low in-
termediation, information age: if you exceed the capacity of a communication 
channel, the “signal” being carried by that channel becomes unintelligible noise. 
The traditional “answer bad speech with more speech” understanding of the mar-
ketplace of ideas attempts to answer bad information (noise) with more infor-
mation. This may work if you are in a quiet room. But if you are in a noisy room, 
a room where everyone is already struggling at the limits how much information 
can be transmitted, that approach only increases the noise floor, which has the 
unintended effect of reducing the amount of information that can be communicat-
ed. The Madisonian approach, on the other hand—that the solution to bad speech 
is slower, more deliberative, speech—is akin to slowing down your rate of speech 
and speaking more slowly and clearly. 
B. Have We Reached Our Channel Capacity? 
Before asking whether we have exceeded humans’ information channel ca-
pacity, it is worth validating this concern by noting that there is empirical evi-
dence that humans are subject to a channel capacity constraint. This is a difficult 
question to study directly, but there is indirect evidence of such a capacity limita-
tion. For instance, a 2011 study, which has led to various follow-up studies, looks 
at the information density of human languages.44 Languages spoken around the 
world have different characteristics. Some have very large vocabularies and others 
have relatively small vocabularies. In some, speakers converse very quickly, while 
in others they speak relatively slowly (in terms of words per minute).45 This study 
reached the remarkable result that the information density of languages is roughly 
constant. For instance, languages with more words tend to be spoken at a slower 
rate, whereas those with fewer words are spoken at a faster rate. This suggests that 
these languages have evolved subject to a common constraint of human listeners’ 
ability to process them. In a recently published follow-up study, the authors of the 
                                                          
 44. François Pellegrino, Christophe Coupé & Egidio Marsico, A Cross-Language Perspective on 
Speech Information Rate, 87 LANGUAGE 539, 539–558 (2011). (“All languages exhibit an equal overall 
communication capacity”) Because there are different encoding strategies and distinct complexities, 
we cannot say they are equally overall complex. See also Morten H. Christiansen & Nick Chater, The 
Now-or-Never bottleneck: A fundamental constraint on language, 39 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN 
SCIENCES 1, 2 (2016). 
 45. For instance, English has been measured at a syllabic rate of 6.19 syllables per second, compared 
to Spanish at 7.82 and Mandarin Chinese at 5.18; the information density of English (that is, how much 
information is conveyed per syllable) has been measured at 0.91, compared to 0.63 for Spanish and 
0.94 for Mandarin Chinese. See Pelligrino, supra note 44, at 544. 
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2011 study estimate a universal average information rate of 39 bits/second as a 
common feature of human language.46 
Approaching the question of channel capacity from the other direction, there 
is evidence that human brains adapt to optimize the ability to process information. 
At one level this suggests that we have ways around any channel capacity con-
straints, but in purely information theoretic terms, this may alternatively suggest 
that how we speak and communicate evolves in response to our communications 
capacity constraints (and, indeed, if we did not face those constraints, we would 
not need to adapt). For instance, studies of “choice paralysis” show that those who 
are averse to shopping are more fatigued by it, due to the overwhelming number 
of choices at their disposal, and therefore are more prone to experiencing choice 
paralysis.47 There is also research showing that exposure to information technolo-
gy is actually altering the structure of Millennials’ brains. While the evidence is 
split, with some suggesting that technology is making us (to use the crude phrase) 
“stupider,”48 there is other evidence that digital natives’ brains are better adapted 
to certain aspects of our current information age.49 Somewhat more anchored to 
the metaphor of language, some languages have many words expressing nuanced 
variations of concepts important to the speakers of that language, compared to 
other languages with simpler vocabularies in other languages where such nuance 
is not needed. The most common example is the richness of Inuit and Yupik dia-
lects’ words for different types of snow as compared to English.50 This example 
suggests that there is optimization around those speakers’ abilities to communicate 
specific concepts, not that they have developed a language that exceeds other 
languages’ information densities. 
Perhaps most important, even if we have not already exceeded our collective 
individual capacity to intelligibly process and use the information that we receive, 
given the ongoing growth in the production and distribution of information, it is 
conceivable that this limit could be soon met. Thinking along these lines, the tra-
ditional “answer bad speech with more speech” understanding of the marketplace 
of ideas only exacerbates this concern. As individuals approach their information-
al capacity, signal (good speech) will increasingly become indistinct from noise 
                                                          
 46. Christophe Coupé, Yoon Mi Oh, Dan Dediu, & François Pellegrino, Different languages, similar 
encoding efficiency: Comparable information rates across the human communicative niche, 5 SCIENCE 
ADVANCES 1, 5 (2019) (“This study provides the most extensive estimation of spoken IR [Information 
Rate] to date, whether in terms of numbers of speakers, languages, or language families. Such an IR 
[is] centered on 39 bits/s … . Despite the across-language dispersion observed for ID and SR, their 
regulatory interaction seems to give rise to a universal attractor.”). 
 47. See generally Raúl G. Sanchis, José-Manuel Rey & Francisco Álvarez, Numerical analysis of a 
time allocation model accounting for choice overload, 91(2) INT’L J. OF COMPUTER MATHEMATICS 
315 (2014) (explaining a research study finding that people who are adverse to shopping are more 
prone to fatigue and choice paralysis.) 
 48. See Elaina Zachos, Technology is changing the Millennial brain, PUBLICSOURCE, (Nov. 14, 
2015), https://www.publicsource.org/technology-is-changing-the-millennial-brain/ (“Too much tech-
nology use also shrinks the outermost part of the brain, making it more difficult to process infor-
mation.”); M.R. O’Connor, Ditch the GPS. It’s Ruining your brain, WASHINGTON POST (June 5, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ditch-the-gps-its-ruining-your-
brain/2019/06/05/29a3170e-87af-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html?utm_term=.bf0ca4501c71. 
 49. See, e.g., Carolyn Crist, On the Mind: What Science Says about Digital Natives, UCLA 
LONGEVITY CTR. (April 10, 2017), https://www.semel.ucla.edu/longevity/news/mind-what-science-
says-about-digital-natives. 
 50. David Robson, Are there really 50 Eskimo words for snow?, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 18, 2012), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21628962-800-are-there-really-50-eskimo-words-for-snow/. 
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(bad speech), which will prompt a cascade of more speech (making more signal 
indistinguishable from noise). Adopting the Madisonian approach, on the other 
hand, would have an opposite, moderating effect on speech that occurs near the 
limit of individuals’ informational capacity. 
C. What Problem Information Theory Describes, Infor-
mation Theory Answers? 
Of course, the capacity of communications systems has grown dramatically–
literally exponentially over the past century. The lesson Information Theory con-
veys is not that that there is a maximum amount of information that can be trans-
mitted. Rather, it is that any given communications channel has a finite capacity. 
If more capacity is needed in a given communications channel, Information 
Theory tells us that we have a few options. First, we can improve the signal-to-
noise ratio; that is, we can reduce the amount of noise on the channel. Second, 
because signal becomes noise if when we exceed the capacity of the channel, in 
cases where the capacity of a communications channel has been exceeded we can 
increase the effective capacity by reducing the amount of information that we are 
attempting to communicate.51 Third, we can increase the amount of bandwidth 
allocated to a communications channel or, what is largely the same thing, add 
communications channels. 
The concern being explored in this article is that modern media is exceeding 
the human capacity to process information. This constraint, the amount of infor-
mation that the human mind can process in a given amount of time, is not one that 
can be circumvented by adding capacity. Instead, if it is the case that we need to 
work around this constraint, we need to do better at managing the signal-to-noise 
ratio. 
From an engineering perspective, we generally do this by one of two means: 
noise filtering or signal splitting (both of which end up, analytically speaking, 
being the same thing). With noise filtering, we reduce background or other un-
wanted noise in the communications channel. This is the equivalent of moving to 
a quiet room to hear a phone call, or even just putting your finger in one ear so 
that you can hear the voice coming from a phone’s speaker more clearly. Signal 
splitting means moving different parts of a signal to different communications 
channels. For instance, the cellular telephone network works by dividing each 
calling area up into lots of smaller areas (called “cells”), each of which is served 
by a single, dedicated antenna. Because each antenna is serving a smaller area, the 
signal is shared between fewer telephones than if the entire town were served by a 
single antenna. This is the rough equivalent of having people placing phone calls 
each go to a separate room to speak.52 
                                                          
 51. That is to say, if a communications channel has a maximum capacity of 100 words per minute 
(to use that as the relevant measure of capacity) but a speaker is speaking at 120 words per minute, the 
recipient may only be able to make out half of the words being said (for an effective communications 
rate of 60 words per minute. If the speaker slows down to 100 words per minute, the effective commu-
nications rate will be 100 words per minute. 
 52. The difference between these two telephone examples is subtle, but important. It also demon-
strates why noise reduction and signal splitting end up being the same thing. In the noise reduction 
example, the person trying to hear what is being said on the phone goes to a separate, quiet, room. In 
the case of signal splitting, a group of people each of whom is trying to speak on a phone call (that is, 
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D. Information and Intermediation 
Applying these ideas to how individuals receive information yields another 
important insight–and an important limitation. If the concern is that individuals 
are receiving too much information (not distinguishing between information as 
signal or noise) to meaningfully process, neither noise filtering nor signal splitting 
is a viable solution  at least not as a solution that can be implemented by the indi-
vidual. Rather, any solution needs to be implemented before the signal reaches the 
individual. 
This is why the disintermediation effect of modern information production 
and distribution is so important to the story.53 In bygone eras we relied on inter-
mediaries—newspapers, book publishers, and broadcasters—to process and dis-
tribute information; there were relatively few of those entities because their opera-
tions were relatively expensive. Today, social media allows for direct peer-to-peer 
production and distribution, at a negligible cost and with a greater potential reach. 
Individuals today have immediate access to nearly every newspaper, blog, and 
other website on the planet. Thirty years ago, most people had access to perhaps a 
few newspapers, television networks, and radio stations–and other sources of in-
formation, such as books, magazines, or even their peers, could only be consulted 
at relatively significant cost (whether in terms of time, infrequency of communica-
tion, or communications medium). Today, however, the Internet makes it possible 
for anyone to receive a seamless stream of information from potentially millions 
of independent, unfiltered, voices. In other words, thirty years ago the challenge 
was to acquire enough information to make informed decisions; today, the chal-
lenge sort the useful information from the rest, so that it can be put to productive 
use. 
In a one-to-one, peer-to-peer, communications network like the Internet, eve-
ry communications pathway is maximally split, which maximizes the amount of 
information that sources from across the Internet can send to any given individual; 
the concept of “splitting” the signal at the point of the recipient is incoherent. This 
is tantamount to saying that, to double an individual’s ability to process infor-
mation, we should double the amount of brain that they have to process that in-
formation. 
Rather, the solution to increasing the capacity of individuals to receive infor-
mation is to filter out the noise. This needs to be done before the information 
reaches the individual already saturated by an overwhelming amount of infor-
mation. We need to re-invent the intermediated media marketplace. 
V. FILTERING IDEAS 
Parts III and IV of this article have endeavored to explain why traditional 
marketplace of ideas understandings of the First Amendment may not be viable 
                                                          
to transmit information via a signal), go into separate rooms. If they don’t go into the separate rooms, 
the listeners on the other end of the line may be able to intelligibly make out what is being said by all 
of the speakers – that is, they are receiving signal, not noise. But if collectively the speakers are trans-
mitting too much signal, then the listeners may not be able to make out what any one speaker is saying 
– that is, the signal becomes noise when the information capacity of the communications channel is 
exceeded. 
 53. See generally supra Part I B. 
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approaches to moderating speech in an era of information superabundance. The 
purpose of this article is primarily to make that case, or at least to stake out its 
contours about Information Theory. But announcing a problem such as this begs 
for thoughts on potential solutions. 
A. Government Regulation is Not a Solution 
As an initial matter, direct government regulation of online speech is not a vi-
able solution – from any tenable American perspective. Prohibiting entire catego-
ries of speech is abhorrent to the Constitution and only occurs in the starkest of 
cases, only targeting very specific categories of speech where there is broad con-
sensus that the category of speech has no redeeming value. The typical example is 
child pornography, typical both because it is a strong example of such indefensi-
ble speech and because it is one of so few categories of speech. 
More doctrinally, “social media,” “online speech,” and other examples of the 
sort of speech that has driven exponential growth in American’s access to infor-
mation refer generally to general-purpose communications platforms that are ca-
pable of transmitting any type of information. Any prohibition or regulation of 
those platforms necessarily encroaches upon very broad categories of speech – 
some bad, much good. Such broad regulation would be untenable under First 
Amendment doctrine.54 As a matter of First Amendment principle, such an ap-
proach runs headlong into the concerns that the First Amendment was meant to 
protect against, and against which the marketplace of ideas concept was intended 
as a bulwark.55 
B. May the Marketplace of Ideas (Redux) Save Us? 
Parts III and IV together argue that the marketplace of ideas fails as we reach 
the limits of individuals’ information capacity. Even before we reach that point, 
we are likely to see a race to the bottom as the costs of producing and distributing 
information decrease, creating opportunities for false speech to monetize their 
market shares at the expense of good speech. As we approach the limits of indi-
viduals’ informational capacities, the “answer bad speech with more speech” theo-
ry exacerbates the informational deficit in which consumers of ideas operate under 
the marketplace of ideas model. 
Perhaps this story is too cynical. Perhaps new forms of intermediaries will en-
ter the market, demonstrating their value to consumers in a way that allows them 
to successfully compete with low-quality disintermediated speech. Perhaps the 
advertising-based model that directs the regressive, race-to-the-bottom dynamic of 
our current marketplace of ideas will collapse–or will merely be displaced by 
alternative approaches to speech intermediation. Perhaps new social norms will 
develop, leading to widespread skepticism of questionable online content and an 
                                                          
 54. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (holding a statutory requirement that ISPs 
filter pornographic material to keep it from children to violate the First Amendment, explaining, “It is 
true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful 
materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to 
adults. As we have explained, the Government may not reduce the adult population to only what is fit 
for children.” (quotation and citations omitted)). 
 55. See supra, notes 26–28. 
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embrace of higher-quality, more reliable, speech. Perhaps our current generation 
of Americans are simply lost, condemned to drift about as uninformed informa-
tional consumers; but on their (our) heels will come a new generation, raised in 
the information economy and more savvy about information hygiene. Perhaps, in 
other words, our current failing marketplace is the fault of the consumers of in-
formation, but in the long run, it will yield higher-quality consumers of infor-
mation for whom the marketplace will function effectively. Or perhaps today’s 
more savvy consumers of information will succeed in our current marketplace–at 
the expense of less savvy consumers–and usher in a new era of the marketplace 
based on their successes. 
There is reason to be skeptical of each of these possibilities, but also reason to 
believe that any of them could come to pass and usher in an era of informationally 
adept individuals. In effect, each is premised on the idea that individuals, as in-
formation consumers, will develop better noise filters–and that these filters will 
operate by treating all online information as noise by default. In each case, to the 
extent that consumers view online-sourced information as meaningful signal, it 
will be because that information bears some external hallmark of quality. In effect, 
this is the recreation of an intermediated information marketplace, just one in 
which the intermediaries may look different from those in past marketplaces of 
ideas. 
C. Can We Sue Our Way Into Better Speech? 
The First Amendment is primarily concerned with government regulation of 
speech, but it also informs the use of law to regulate speech between private par-
ties. This is best seen in defamation law. As in other areas of law, the United 
States is generally more protective of speech rights than most other countries 
around the world.56 In the context of defamation law, this strong level of protec-
tion is demonstrated by the general principles that truth is a defense to claims of 
defamation and that the institutional press must demonstrate actual malice to be 
deemed liable for defamation against a public figure.57 In general, and under First 
Amendment principles, we prefer that the law not be used as a sword in speech 
debates. As is so often the case with the First Amendment, the response to true 
speech, even if truly harmful, is more speech; the response to false speech, if not 
harmful to an individual, is more speech. There is a strong presumption in favor of 
institutional platforms of speech (the institutional press) to facilitate and encour-
age the production of more speech even in the face of harmfully erroneous speech. 
As with the First Amendment generally, this article is not intended to delve 
deeply into defamation doctrine. Rather, it makes a single observation and a single 
suggestion. The observation is that American law has traditionally placed the bur-
den for acting against harmful speech on the listener or subject of that speech, not 
on the speaker. The suggestion is that, in light of the changing costs of producing 
and distributing speech, the balance of this burden may need to change. The tradi-
tional burden has served as an inducement to speech: given the historically high 
                                                          
 56. Allison G. Belnap, Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad Theory That Threatens 
Basic Human Rights, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 635, 651 (2010) (discussing how definitions of “incitement” 
in non-U.S. countries allow for broader regulations than in the United States). 
 57. Id. at 645. 
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cost of engaging in speech, and the view that public discourse is important to the 
functioning of our democracy, we have wanted to avoid placing undue burdens on 
those who engage in speech. Instead, we have channeled those disagreeing with 
such speech to avail themselves of speech, not speech-silencing litigation, as the 
preferred form of response. 
The (deliberate) effect of this approach has been to prompt a signification 
amount of speech in this country. This effect is generally understood as a good 
thing. But if the Information Theory account of speech offered above is correct, 
then too much speech–even if it is “good” speech–can in fact be harmful. This is a 
puzzle for First Amendment doctrine to struggle with. But it is not a novel or even 
particularly difficult puzzle for the law to address: the law generally allocates 
burdens to minimize social costs.58 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The first line of this article stated that “[t]he Internet has changed speech and 
our traditional understandings of speech regulation are struggling to adapt.” This 
observation, on its own, is both obvious and uninteresting, even if it captures the 
essence of one of the most important challenges our country faces today. 
This article has added a perspective from Information Theory to how we dis-
cuss the First Amendment. Information Theory suggests that there is a hard limit 
to how much information any given individual can process. Perhaps more im-
portant, from the perspective of a nation predicated on the deliberative engage-
ment of the people in the formation and operation of its democratic government, it 
suggests that once this threshold of informational capacity is surpassed, it be-
comes increasingly difficult for the listener to differentiate meaningful infor-
mation from noise. Saturating ourselves with information does not just mean 
reaching a plateau–it actually reduces our ability to use information. 
To the extent that this understanding is true, this poses a direct challenge to 
the marketplace of ideas understanding of the First Amendment and the idea that 
“the response to bad speech is more speech” is a viable basis for a deliberative 
democracy in the age of information technology. To be clear, this article does not 
assert that we have definitely reached this point of informational saturation; it 
does, however, argue that we may have, because such a limit absolutely does ex-
ist.  Perhaps the marketplace of ideas will adapt, finding ways to reward slower, 
more deliberative speech, or rejecting informationally saturated (or saturating) 
platforms such as social media. If this does not happen, the law, including the 
First Amendment, may be the only bulwark against information saturation and the 
dangers that it bears for democratic institutions. 
                                                          
 58. See generally Ronald H. Coase, ”The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 J. OF L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see 
generally Guiudo Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85(6) YALE L.J. 1089 (1972). 
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